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THE REFEREE'S DECISION THAT MR. ANDRE,VS' PREEXISTING
PERMANENT IMPAI&,IENTS \VERE NOT SUBJECTIVE HINDRANCES TO
EMPLOYMENT AS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND C01\1PETENT
EVIDENCE AND \VAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.

,v

1.

The Referee and Commission did not construe the worker's compensation
laws in favor of lVIr. Andrews.

It must be remembered, that the worker's compensation laws are to be construed in favor
of the claimant. As this Court held:
The provisions of workers' compensation laws are to be liberally
construed in favor of the claimant, as the humane purposes they
seek to serve leave no room for narrow, technical construction.

Fowble v. Snoline Express, Inc., 146 Idaho 70, 74, 190 P.3d 889, 893 (2008). Further, "'the

primary purpose of [Industrial Commission] proceedings [is] the attainment of justice in each
individual case."' Green v. Green, 160 Idaho 275,281,371 P.3d 329,335 (2016)(citation
omitted)). As will be argued in the remainder of this brief, the Referee's decision, and the
Commission's adoption of that decision failed to construe the statutes in Mr. Andrews' favor, as
they are not based on substantial and competent evidence and/or are clearly erroneous.
2.

The Referee's decision that there were no subjective hindrances is not based
on substantial and competent evidence and is clearly erroneous.

The Court may set aside the Industrial Commission's conclusions where "they are clearly
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evidence or where the findings of fact do not, as a matter of law, suppo1i the order. Id. (citing,
LC. §72-732; Page v. J.fcCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302,305, 179 P.3d 265,268 (2008)).
Fmiher, "a challenge to the Commission's application of a statute is a question oflaw over which
[the] Comi exercises free review." Smith v. JB.Parson Co., 127 Idaho 937, 943, 908 P.2d 1244,
1250 (1996)(citing, Idaho Const. Art. V, §9; Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333,
336, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994)).
Contrary to the ISIF's arguments, Mr. Andrews is not asking the Court to reweigh the
evidence. Rather, Mr. Andrews properly seeks appellate review of the Commission's order, as a
review of the record establishes that the Referee's and Commission's conclusion that there \\'ere
no subjective hindrances to employment is not supported by substantial, competent evidence.
ISIF does not refute the following 18 pre-existing job impainnents, which were both
subjective and objective:
1.

Bilateral knee surgeries;

2.

Bilateral shoulder surgeries;

3.

Painful feet and foot surgeries;

4.

Multiple back surgeries;

5.

25 pound lifting restrictions;
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6.

8.

Employer knew of knee limitations;

9.

Unable to climb ladder;

10.

Could not use his toes;

11.

Supervisor restricted his job because of physical condition;

12.

Unable to kneel;

13.

Unable to squat;

14.

Unable to stand for more than 5 minutes without support;

15.

Unable to \Valk on uneven surfaces;

16.

Tendinitis in both hands;

17.

Unable to do repetitive work with his hands;

18.

Unable to do heavy lifting due to the fonnal 25 pound lifting restriction imposed

by Dr. Allen following his 2007 back surgery. See Claimant's Hearing Exhibit D (Andrews 81).

In Mr. Andrews' opening appellate brief, and at the hearing below, it was acknowledged
that by physical appearance, Mr. Andrews resembles Santa Claus. By work ethic and
determination, and his subjective desires, he more likely resembled the "Black Knight" from
Monty Python's, "The Holy Grail."
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Even with his 18 objective findings, Mr. Andrews still desires to work- like the Black Knight
who continues to fight with his arms and one leg gone. Subjectively, even after the last leg was
cut off, he fought on. So too does Mr. Andrews. Even after his last surgery, Mr. Andrews still
wanted to work. The Commission and Referee erroneously mistook this for a lack of "subjective
hindrance" and concluded that Mr. Andrews had no physician imposed, permanent restrictions
prior to the 3-17-2009 accident, and that said accident alone rendered him totally and permanent
disabled. Not only is the Commission's order not supported by substantial and competent
evidence and clearly erroneous, it is also a misapplication of the statute, mandating the Court to
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any physician-imposed restrictions at the time of his accident of March 17, 2009." R.,
125, ,I 65 [Emphasis supplied]. 1 This conclusion is a direct violation of LC. §72-332(2), which
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
[T]he mere fact that a claimant is employed at the time of the
subsequent injury shall not create a presumption that the
pre-existing pennanent physical impainnent was not of such
seriousness as to constitute such hindrance or obstacle to obtaining
employment.

The Commission's aforementioned finding clearly violates the statute. It is also belied by the
facts in the record, that in 2007, Dr. Clark Allen, following a third surgery gave Mr. Andrews
pennission to return to work with a 25 pound lifting restriction and frequent changes in

position. See Claimant's Hearing Exhibit D (Andrews 81). In addition, the LDS Church's IME
expert, Dr. J. Craig Stevens documented the permanent, pre-existing 25 pound weight restriction.

Claimant's Hearing Exh. D (Andrews 268). Dr. Collins also documented this. Claimant's
Hearing Edi. A., p. 3 (Andrews 3). The ISIF has never refuted that these restrictions existed
prior to the industrial accident on March 17, 2009.
As to Mr. Andrews' hearing testimony, the minimal response the ISIF posited was related

This is also clearly e1Toneous, as in addition to Mr. Andrews'25 pound lifting restriction,
he also had a restriction with his knees, climbing ladders, squatting and kneeling.
1
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to
were surgeries on his low back; pre-existing foot and "turf toe" conditions; both left and right
knee impainnents; bilateral shoulder surgeries and impainnents; and a bad disk in his neck.
Hearing Tr.,p. 26:2-p. 27:l;p. 35:15-18;p. 36:15-23;p. 37:10-p. 38:13;p. 41:18-p. 42:4;p.
42: 12-p. 43:2; p. 43:3-16. The ISIF has never refuted Mr. Andrews' testimony as to this

hindrances. 3
Also, Mr. Andrews' testimony was confinned by Dr. Collins, as well as the ISIF's expert,
Delyn Porter. 4 Defendants' Hearing Exh. A., pp. 14-15 & 19. Further, Dr. Selznick's assignment
of impairn1ent ratings to Mr. Andrews' pre-existing impainnents supported Mr. Andrews'
testimony. Dr. Selznick assigned impainnents as follows: 5% to 10% -right knee; 1% to 2% ;
1% to 2% - left knee; 3% to 4%- right shoulder surgery; 3% to 4% -left shoulder surgery; and 2%

2Respondent's

Brief, p. 12-13.

ISIF misses the point in asserting that evidence of a subjective hindrance has not been
contradicted. Mr. Andrews' asserted that his pre-existing impainnents, which are subjective,
have not been contradicted in any way. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 27. ISIF provides no
factual basis to dispute these hindrances.
3

ISIF gives short shrift to Mr. Porter's opinions in its brief, asserting his part was merely
to identify potential jobs. Respondent's Brief~ p. 7. However, to the contrary, Mr. Porter's
acknowledgn1ent that Mr. Andrews had several pre-existing injuries related to his right knee,
prior back surgeries and significant functional capacity restrictions with standing, walking,
sitting, lifting/carrying, pushing/pulling, bending/stooping/kneeling, twisting, forward reaching,
overhead reaching, climbing, gripping, handling, feeling, sleeping and driving and AD Ls are
certainly relevant to the subjective hindrances and disability issues.
4
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decision. Moreover, the Commission and Referee ignored and misstated Mr. Andrews'
uncontradicted testimony as to his pre-existing impainnents, in violation of the holding in
Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 758, 302 P.3d 718, 726 (2013)(A
Commission referee "must accept as true the positive, uncontradicted testimony of a credible
witness .... "). Fmiher, the Conunision violated LC. §72-332(2) in concluding that because Mr.
Andrews was employed at the time of the 2009 industrial accident, there were no subjective
hindrances to employment. These findings are clearly erroneous and the Court must set aside the
Commission's order.
B. THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL AND COJVIPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE

COMMISSION'S DECISION TO CONCLUDE THE ISIF IS NOT LIABLE FOR A
PORTION OF MR. ANDRE,VS' TOTAL AND PER:.,fANENT DISABILITY.

ISIF admits that the Referee's conclusion at paragraph 67, that Dr. Collins' testified the
2009 accident alone made Mr. Andrews unemployable, was not Dr. Collins' testimony.
Respondent's Brief,p. 18,fii.3. In fact, Dr. Collins' testimony was as follows:
Q.

Okay. So is your 2013 repo1i saying now that he's more
totally and pennanently disabled?

A.

No. I think what it says is that when you're not looking
just at the restrictions for the 2009 back injury and you
look at all the other conditions that he had, that he's
realistically not employable.
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injury along with all his past conditions that rendered him realistically unemployable.
This unequivocally establishes the Referee's conclusion is not based on substantial and
competent evidence and is clearly e1Toneous.
Despite this, the ISIF, like the Referee, goes on to misrepresent Dr. Collins' testimony, by
incorrectly stating Dr. Collins testified Mr. Andrews' restrictions from the 2009 work injury
alone rendered him totally and pen11anently disabled. 5 No where in Dr. Collins' testimony did
she testify that the 2009 work accident, alone, rendered Mr. Andrews totally and pen11anently
disabled. Dr. Collins Post Hearing Deposition, p. 38:25 top. 42: 13. To the contrary, in her
repmi, Dr. Collins' concluded the exact opposite, as follows:
In my opinion, Mr. Andrews is realistically pen11anently and totally
disabled by his significant physical limitations, his age, his
appearance, his chronic pain and his lack of transferable skill for
lighter work. I do think his total disability is a combination of
his pre-existing low back, bilateral shoulder conditions,
bilateral knee conditions, limited hand function, painful feet
and his current low back pain, right knee replacement, bowel
incontinence and his balance problems.

Claimant's Hearing Exhibit A, pp. 4-5 (Andrevvs 5-6). [Emphasis added]. Moreover, Dr. Collins
testified to the exact opposite of what the ISIP and the Referee have stated, evidenced by the

5Respondent's

Brief, p. 18; R., 126, ,I69.
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not
his restrictions from the back injury and considering all of the
limitations he had with his feet, his knees, his shoulder, his neck, his
chronic pain, his narcotic pain usage, his age, that it would be very
difficult for him to find an employer to hire him, and he would need
significant accommodations in any job.
111

Dr. Collins Post Hearing Deposition., p. 26:25 to p.27:6 [Emphasis supplied].

Additionally, the ISIF's position as to Dr. Selznick's testimony not being clear, is
inaccurate. Dr. Selznick's testimony was that Mr. Andrews sustained an aggravation and
acceleration of a pre-existing impairment related to his right knee and low back.
Claimant's Hearing Exh. B., p. 16 (Andre1vs 23); Dr. Selznick Post Hearing Deposition, p. 22:3p. 23.

Further, in its response, the ISIF does not refute the fact that Dr. J. Craig Stevens, the

LDS Church's IME expe1i, found that Mr. Andrews had restrictions following his 2007 low back
surgery of 25 pound lifting restriction. Claimant's Hearing Exlz. D (Andrews 268). Further, Dr.
Stevens concluded that the 2007 restriction was a pennanent restriction. Id. This certainly
establishes that the Referee's conclusion, that Mr. Andrews' total and pennanent impainnent was
caused solely by the 2009 accident, is clearly erroneous.
While the ISIF' s cites to Green, supra, as supportive of its position, a careful reading of
the case shows its conclusion suppo1iing Mr. Andrews' request to set aside the Commission's
order. In Green, the referee and the Commission did apportion liability to the ISIF. Id., 160
Idaho at 285, 371 P.3d 339. Here, a review of the entire record establishes the Commission's
APPELLA,''ff'S REPLY BRIEII - PAGE 9
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A.ndre\vs was not employable. Likewise, Dr. Selznick's testimony that Mr. Andrews exacerbated
and aggravated pre-existing impainnents, which also meets the "but for" standard. Finally, Mr.
,i\ndrews' testimony as to the multiple issues he had pre-2009, all clearly establish that the
Commission's order denying benefits and apportiomnent was clearly erroneous and not based on
substantial and competent evidence.

C. THE ISIF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES OR COSTS.
The ISIF is not entitled to attorney's fees or costs on appeal, as the record before the
Court shows the Co1m11ission's order is not based on substantial competent evidence and was
clearly erroneous. Mr. Andrews' appeal is well grounded in fact, is based on a good faith
argument and not filed for an improper purpose. W11ile the ISIF cites to Neihart v. Universal

Joint Auto Parts, Inc., 141 Idaho 801, 118 P.3d 135 (2005), the facts of that case are inapposite
to those present in this case. In Neihart, the claimant's attorney "misstated this Court's standard
ofreview" by asserting the standard ofreview was whether the record suppmied the claimant's
position. Id., 141 Idaho at 803-04, 118 P.3d at 135-36. Furthermore, in Neihart, the claimant's
attorney failed to file any reply brief to respond or clarify what the issues were. As the Court can
see in this case, Mr. Andrews has asserted the c01Tect standard, whether the Commission's order
is based on substantial competent evidence and/or was clearly erroneous, in both of his briefs on
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There, the Court set forth the following standard in denying an award of fees under I.A.R.
11.2 (fon11erly Rule 11.1 ):
Fowble seeks attorney's fees under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.1. This rule states the
following:
Every notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief and other document of a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one (1) licensed attorney of
record of the state of Idaho, in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall
be stated before the same may be filed. A party who is not represented by an
attorney shall sign the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or other document
and state the party's address. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certificate that the attorney or party has read the notice of appeal, petition, motion,
b1ief or other document; that to the best of the signers knowledge, infon11ation,
and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
If the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief, or other document is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an approp1iate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the notice of
appeal, petition, motion, brief or other document including a reasonable attorneys
fee.
This rule serves to sanction attorneys who violate the certification that they made
when signing a notice of appeal. \Ve cannot say that this appeal was so far
outside the realm of reasonability that it warrants a sanction on the losing
attorney. Fees therefore are not awarded.

Fowble, 146 Idaho at 77, 190 P.3d at 896 [Emphasis supplied]. In Fowble, the Court affim1ed
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case
applies to preclude the award of attorney's fees to the ISIF against Mr. Andrews' counsel. Mr.
Andrews and undersigned counsel's appeal is reasonable, given the lack of substantial,
competent evidence to suppo1i the clearly eIToneous decision reached by the Referee and the
Commission.
Further, this Comi has also held, in interpreting Rule 11.2 that "sanctions are generally
not appropriate unless there is '" a showing that the appeal was brought for an improper
purpose."' Danti v. Danti, 146 Idaho 929,944,204 P.3d 1140,1155 (2009)(citing, Chavez v.

Barrus, 146 Idaho 212,226, 192 P.3d I 036, 1050 (2008)). In Danti, the Court did not award
attorney's fees to the prevailing respondent, noting the appellant had raised legitimate questions
and the respondent failed to show the appeal was brought for an improper purpose. Id. Likewise,
here, the Court should deny an award of attorney's fees to the ISIF, as it has failed to establish
this appeal was brought for an improper purpose.
D. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Andrews respectfully requests that the Court reverse the May
10, 2016 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Reconunendation adopted by the
Commission, and remand this case back to the Commission, with instructions that Mr. Andrews
is totally disabled, an odd-lot worker and to make application of the Carey Fornrnla to award Mr.
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